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Abstract 
Chinese economic growth has accompanied the rise and development of the Chinese 
economic model with its own types of multinational enterprises, and state-owned 
enterprises.  Major stock market plunges in 2015 have taken away the focus from the 
model and the manufacturing base that upholds it.  Analyses of the system of the 
Chinese state, its enterprises and the private sector need to continue to understand the 
future of this economy and its implications for the rest of the world.  Central Asian 
energy markets, which China has entered a decade ago, are important in this context, 
as their future behaviour will have consequences for the EU, North American and 
Australian markets.  The Chinese state is the owner of the largest banks and sovereign 
wealth funds in the world. When China lost its energy independence in 1993, it began 
to rely on Central Asian energy markets and increasingly placed more emphasis on the 
region as a hub for its economic expansion, and as a strategic location and export 
market. The region, neighboring Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, is one of the 
foci of organizations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), and 
projects such as the Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB). Chinese trade and foreign direct 
investment (FDI) in the region involve plans to build economic and other links from 
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region across Central Asia. This paper argues that 
Central Asia faces some challenges due to its landlocked status, and industrial 
structure and markets, despite its energy and mineral resources, some of which is yet 
to be developed.   
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Introduction 
Contemporary international trade and FDI order is primarily reliant upon the co-
operation of individual participants, or their coalitions, and the existence of stabilizing 
hegemonic powers in international politics, as per numerous theoretic constructions 
(Ikenberry et al., 1988; Kindleberger, 1973; McKeown, 1983; Snidal, 1985). 
International trade and FDI environment is built on international economic power 
structures that are not always stable (Lake, 1988; Waltz, 1979). There is divergence of 
opinion on whether the co-operation of individual countries or their conflicts shape the 
international order (Grieco, 1993; Keohane, 1984; Krasner, 1991). John H. Dunning’s 
‘eclectic paradigm’ of ‘ownership, locational, internalization, [OLI] advantages’ has 
been instrumental in defining and evaluating trade and FDI activities of multinational 
enterprises (MNEs) (Dunning, 1988, 1993, 1995, 1997, 2006). According to Dunning, 
the ‘international trade’ perspectives (such as Aliber, 1993; Kojima, 1982) that are 
inspired by neo-classical framework downplay the significance of the advantages that 
MNEs possess and utilize (Dunning, 2000). Such perspectives implicitly assume that 
in trade all good are exchanged between independent buyers and sellers across 
national borders while in fact, as theories that simultaneously cover international trade 
and international production (i.e. the ‘eclectic paradigm’) explicitly postulate, the 
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transfer of immediate products is undertaken within the same MNEs (Dunning, 1998, 
p. 2). A contemporary example of this is visible in the operations of Chinese 
corporations, MNEs, and state owned enterprises (SOEs)] that invest and trade in 
overseas energy and mineral markets, and also export overseas. Overall, international 
trade and FDI are the two complementary domains of MNEs and SOEs. The post-
Second World War international order originates from the global expansion of Western 
market institutions that themselves had emerged in Europe over a period of several 
centuries. Capitalist models in Korea, Japan and China are built on non-Western 
institutional frameworks (Dunning, 1995, p. 461). Prior to the rise of China, the 
Japanese model represented the East Asian capitalism (Park, 2011, pp. 248-250). The 
post-Second World War reconstruction of the Japanese economy was simultaneous 
with the Japanese model getting co-opted, as an ally of the US, into the new order 
(Bayari, 2012, p. 160). Chinese state-guided capitalism is a much later entrant to the 
contemporary trade and investment order (Hsu et al., 2011; Urio, 2012). Models such 
as the Chinese and Japanese exist in context of the international order but with their 
own respective institutions. The post-Second World War growth period was the best 
era that the Japanese economy has ever had (Cumings, 1997, pp. 152; Schaller, 1985, 
p. 239; Tsuru, 1993, pp. 83-84). In later decades, it was the accession of China to the 
WTO that allowed its market model to participate in the world of trade and FDI 
agreements (Dunning, 2003, p. 1). Thus, the post-Second World War trade and FDI 
order includes the “constructers” of the order, and the countries that became “co-
opted.” Japan and China’s growth would not have come about if they had not been 
allowed access to Western markets of consumers, resources, technology and 
education (Dunning and Lundan, 2008, p. 755). MNE trade and FDI activities have 
always included lobbying foreign countries for friendly economic policies (Dunning, 
1995, pp. 464, 483). Since the early 1980s, the relationships between MNEs and 
governments have become increasingly co-operative, within the process of 
globalization (Dunning, 1998, p. 282). The Chinese capitalist market reforms of the 
early 1980s and the subsequent expansion of Chinese SOEs coincided with this new 
international business environment. China’s capitalist market take off has been 
characterized by simultaneous search for markets and natural resources (Dunning, 
2008, p. 8). The Chinese model began as a national, and yet an internationalizing 
model, that is, its viability as a national economic system has always been dependent 
on its cross-border success, which also expanded into the Central Asian crude oil and 
natural gas industries. Dunning’s ‘investment development path model’ proposes that 
as a country develops, there is a change in the configuration of the ‘OLI advantages’ 
that its corporations enjoy overseas (Dunning et al, 2001). The Chinese state, SOEs, 
and MNEs have long been aware that expansion in the domestic market is not 
disassociated from expansion of Chinese business activity overseas. The Chinese 
state’s ‘go out [zou chu qu]’ strategy, backed by its foreign currency reserves, has been 
the main impetus behind the start of the Chinese corporations’ overseas expansion to 
find markets and resources (Alon et al., 2010, p. 4; Chen, 2011, p. 1; Sauvant, 2005, 
p.676). The Chinese foreign currency reserves were US$4 trillion as of October 2014 
government figures, which are the largest in the world, and more than the total of the 
next nine largest reserves held by governments (State Administration of Foreign 
Exchange, 2014). Chinese SOEs’ international character derives from their securing of 
critical raw materials and energy via mergers and acquisitions internationally (Athreye 
and Kapur, 2009, p. 211). Japan was in the same situation in the late 19th and early 
20th centuries as it needed to export industrial output and secure raw materials 
simultaneously that required the overseas networking of its general trading companies 
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[sogo shosha] (Dunning and Lundan, 2008, p. 157). Chinese SOEs are enterprising 
hallmarks of Chinese capitalism. The term “state capitalism” is not highly relevant in 
this context as the boundary between private capital and state capital in China has not 
yet been clearly defined. Trade and investment activities originating from China are 
subsidized by the state through direct and indirect contributions, and by channeling 
these activities through SOEs (Haley and Haley, 2013, pp. 3-14). Chinese SOEs have 
96 per cent share of the top ten corporations in the country, excluding unlisted entities 
such as public utilities and services (Büge, 2013; Wooldridge, 2012; Szamosszegi and 
Cole Kyle, 2011). Chinese capitalism has enabled growth without destabilizing the 
existing power structure, and ensured the continued dominance of Communist Party 
while improving the allocation of resources (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012). SOEs 
may change organizational character but are unlikely to ever assume a role that goes 
against the interests of the Chinese state that has always provided support for them. 
China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation (Sinopec Ltd), the world’s largest 
corporation by revenue level, China National Petroleum Corporation (the world’s third 
largest corporation by revenue level), and State Grid Corporation of China (the world’s 
eighth largest corporation by revenue level) are all SOEs. The Chinese state also owns 
the largest sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) in the world, which sets the pace for others 
(Xing and Shaw, 2013; Xu and Bahgat, 2011). Thus, the state leadership has 
characterized the indigenous institutional organization of the Chinese model, and the 
clearest contemporary evidence of the state creation and sponsorship of markets is 
visible in the Chinese electronics and telecommunications manufacturing sector that 
includes Huawei, which is the largest global corporation in its sector. Huawei, ZTE, 
Haier and Lenovo (all major exporters to Central Asia and elsewhere) are all either 
creations of the Chinese state, or upheld by its financial support (Hawes, 2012). The 
largest and founding shareholder of Lenovo is a form of a state think-thank, and Haier, 
after its inception as a SOE, has long identified itself as a privately owned collective, 
which is also what Huawei presents itself as (McGregor, 2012, pp. 201-204). What they 
all arguably have in common is the state assistance. (Dalton, 2011; Montlake, 2012; 
Muncaster, 2012; Schmidt et al., 2012). The success of Chinese manufacturers and 
their internalization of foreign markets have progressed in conjunction with the increase 
in the Chinese corporate mergers and acquisitions overseas. In Dunning’s ‘eclectic 
paradigm’, ‘locational advantages’ of the host market and ‘ownership advantages’ of 
the investor determine the type of investment. Overall, the Chinese FDI displays a 
pattern in which the type of investment is highly dependent on the type of host market, 
i.e. ‘developed countries’ and ‘developing countries’ (Cheung and Qian, 2009, p. 336). 
 
What is Beijing Consensus? 
The term of Beijing Consensus, first coined in 2004, has arguably come to symbolize 
the Chinese economic model. Some have argued this be relevant, as an alternative 
economic growth model, to some developing nations that did not benefit from the 
distribution of FDI and trade in the last so many decades of globalization.  The Beijing 
Consensus’ interaction with such countries is in direct proportion to the fiscal powers 
and aims of Beijing. The Beijing Consensus is argued by some to be an alternative (to 
the Washington Consensus) global organization, and a model that answers to the 
particular needs of Chinese society (Dirlik, 2006, p. 7). There is also the held notion 
that the Beijing Consensus recognizes the co-existence of commonality and difference 
(Rebol, 2010, p. 7). It is also argued that the ‘consensus' is Beijing’s way to manage 
China’s globalization, the eventual outcome of which may lead to a complex network 
of inter-state relationships (Abad, 2010, pp. 14-15). The notion of such a consensus 
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does not make strong claims about, for example, an equitable distribution of resources, 
wealth, services, or products but rather refers to a policy of open door to discussions 
of a variety of topics. It is imbued with the idea that it is a model of a co-opting process 
with a difference. This paper does not probe the validity of this argument, which would 
require more space, and which is highly problematic. Chinese economy’s mixed 
character is most intriguing, as the country has evolved sets of institutions, which are 
dissimilar to those of the countries in the West, and the Chinese institutions have 
created high rates of growth, which nevertheless may present eventual drawbacks, as 
per the Nobel laureate Douglass C. North (North, 2013, p. 18). The ‘China model’ has 
one overwhelming priority, which is to keep functioning within the global economy, while 
masking over domestic issues (Dirlik and Prazniak, 2012, p. 287). ‘Chinese 
globalization’ is a process that has been partially shaped by the global economy. The 
2008 global financial crisis reduced Chinese investment in export related expansion 
and increased domestic investment in infrastructure, welfare, housing and health 
(Abad, 2010, p. 58). In short, when business overseas proved unprofitable, there was 
an increased investment in the vast domestic market. Overall, the notion of Beijing 
Consensus is not an officially professed policy and is a rather broad definition of the 
Chinese state’s methods of simultaneously dealing with its domestic politics, economic 
growth [in its varying rates across the regions in China], and the global economy 
through Chinese SOEs and MNEs (Xing and Shaw, 2013, pp. 88-89). Both SOE and 
MNE overseas activities are supported by the Chinese SWFs. In the case of China, the 
private investment and government investment are synchronized because of the 
political system, which creates a competitive advantage against other major 
economies. Chinese corporations’ overseas construction and other types of project 
proposals are priced at low profit margins and/or backed by loans from domestic 
institutions such as the China’s Export-Import Bank (Goh, 2014; Bradsher, 2014). Thus, 
one of the aims of this neo-mercantilism, defined as a form of economic nationalism, is 
to reject efficiency and short-term-profit-driven market calculations in favor of those 
seen to be advancing national power (Ziegler and Menon, 2014, p. 19). Chinese foreign 
currency reserves provide further advantages in this respect. China has several 
economic tools at its disposal. The largest foreign currency reserves, growing 
investments overseas, the world’s largest consumer market, and a centrally driven 
economy with state guided or state owned gigantic corporations.  
 
Chinese trade and FDI in Central Asia 
The paper will now discuss the Chinese trade and FDI in Central Asia in reference to 
economic structuring in the region. When the Soviet Union disintegrated, five new 
countries emerged in Central Asia, and at that time many presumed that the region 
would inevitably come under Iranian influence but instead there developed a complex 
international rivalry, bringing to mind the 19th century ‘Great Game’ paradigm of the 
British and Russia imperialist aims, to influence and control Central Asia's destiny, 
trade, and oil, gas and mineral resources (Blank, 1995, p. 187). Discussions on the 
region include Azerbaijan due to its high volume energy exports, its membership of the 
Turkic heritage and the geographical proximity between Turkey, Azerbaijan 
Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan (Çagatay, 2006; Frye, 1996; Johanson and Csató, 
1998; Prazniak, 2013). Iran is also home to Azerbaijani and other Turkic minorities 
(Souleimanov et al., 2013). After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia remained 
keen to maintain its near monopoly over the transport of natural gas and crude oil 
resources of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan, and worked with Iran to 
prevent the split of the Caspian Sea into five sovereign sectors, and thus making the 
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construction of new non-Russian territorial pipelines out of Central Asia construction 
difficult (Ruseckas, 1998, pp. 52, 55, 58, 60). Turkmenistan was thus unable to build 
pipelines to Azerbaijan to export energy to the EU via Georgia and Turkey.  Moreover, 
Russian, and Iranian, support for Armenia and its occupation of Azerbaijani territory 
limited the possibilities of new pipelines.  Presently, Azerbaijan-Turkey links have to 
detour via Georgia, another country that has long suffered post-Soviet era territorial 
crisis. However, the most significant change that affected the region’s economy came 
from elsewhere. In 1993, as its oil consumption exceeded its production levels China 
lost its energy independence (Mathews, 2008, p. 60). This intensified its focus on 
Central Asia as the location of nearest foreign reserves, and its investment levels in the 
region are now fast surpassing those that are from Russia (Nichol, 2014, pp. 16-17). 
China has become a major global investor and trader of Asian, African and Latin 
American commodities. Its fiscal status is the main factor in this context. Of twelve 
global banks with over a trillion US$ in assets, four are from China and each one of 
them is valued over US$2.4 trillion, as per Table 1  
 
Table 1: World’s Top Banks  
Rank  Bank name  Total assets (US$ Billion) 
1 Industrial & Commercial Bank of China (ICBC)  3,181.88 
2 HSBC Holdings  2,758.45 
3 China Construction Bank Corporation  2,602.54 
4 BNP Paribas  2,589.19 
5 Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group  2,508.84 
6 JPMorgan Chase & Co  2,476.99 
7 Agricultural Bank of China  2,470.43 
8 Bank of China 2,435.49 
9 Credit Agricole Group  2,346.56 
10 Barclays PLC  2,266.82 
11 Deutsche Bank  2,250.64 
12 Bank of America  2,149.85 
13 Japan Post Bank  1,968.27 
Source: http://www.relbanks.com/worlds-top-banks/assets, March 31 2014 balance sheets and 
exchange rates. 
 
While China has become both the dominant investor and trader in Central Asia, Russia, 
by contrast, has remained dependent on continuous FDI to explore, extract, and export 
its energy reserves, which are its primary revenue sources (Coburn, 2010b, p. 24). 
 
Central Asia and the Significance of Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region for 
Chinese FDI 
China is the largest trading partner of Central Asia. Turkmenistan enjoys a massive 
surplus from China trade, followed by Kazakhstan. The other three Central Asian 
countries run deficits of which Kyrgyzstan is the worst case with a deficit that is close 
US$5 billion, as per 2012 figures (Table 2).  
 
Table 2: Central Asia-China Trade in US$ Billions 
 Imports from China Exports to China Balance of Trade 
Kazakhstan 11.001 14.675 3.674 
Kyrgyzstan 5.073 0.088 -4.985 
Tajikistan 1.747 0.010 -1.737 
Turkmenistan 1.699 8.673 6.974 
Uzbekistan 1.783 1.091 -0.692 
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Source: Mariani, 2013, p. 10. 
 
Chinese energy imports from Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, and exports to Central 
Asia form the bulk of the Chinese economic activity there (Nichol, 2014, p. 14). Further, 
China has long recognized that in order to stabilize and strengthen its economic growth 
it needs to further economically expand into Central Asia, and become the major player, 
thus guaranteeing stability in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, home to another 
nation with the Turkic heritage (McMillan, 2004, pp. 3-5). China aims to transform this 
region into a regional hub for its trade with Central Asia, Russia, and the EU, that will 
involve the project named the ‘Silk Road Economic Belt’ (SREB). China’s strategy in 
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region and Central Asia is defined by the endeavor to 
achieve a “double integration” of Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region with China 
proper and Central Asia by extending modern infrastructure throughout Xinjiang Uyghur 
Autonomous Region and connecting them to neighboring Central Asian countries to 
reach their oil and natural gas resources, all of which have been underwritten by the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), and bilateral political, economic and 
military relations (Clarke, 2008, pp. 107-111). Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are both 
economically challenged and politically fragile countries bordering China’s Xinjiang 
Uyghur Autonomous Region, and will play a growing role in the transit of energy 
(Rickleton, 2014b). Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan (the parts of the former Soviet border) 
and Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region form a zone of what appears to be relative 
impoverishment and underdevelopment between China’s industrialized, densely 
populated and wealthy east, and Central Asian countries of Kazakhstan and 
Turkmenistan which are the region’s two biggest energy exporters. Turkmenistan, 
especially, is in a strong position as it has a relatively small population.  The lack of 
industrialization in parts of Central Asia is, in part, a residual effect of the Soviet era, 
especially its last decades. China’s ‘Great Western Development’ campaign, managed 
from Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, serves, among other functions, as a post-
Soviet collapse stabilization remedy, to develop and better control Xinjiang Uyghur 
Autonomous Region in order to secure access to Central Asia, and increase the 
Chinese influence, as per one view (Clarke, 2013, pp. 7-9). It is, in conjunction with the 
SREB, an attempt to replicate the Soviet economic policy over the region, but from the 
opposite direction. As was the case with the Soviet era, the success of this current 
process depends on the fiscal and political stability of the ‘centre’ and the amounts it is 
willing to invest. Central Asia is an important zone of the Beijing Consensus. As such 
that, after building the SCO, the first multilateral group that China started on its own, 
and enlarging it to include discussions of trade, economics and energy, China had the 
SCO run a joint military exercise in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region in 2003 
(Cooper Ramo, 2004, pp. 47, 52, 53). China was subjugated by Western and Japanese 
capitalism in the nineteenth century, its development was blocked and it became their 
‘periphery’, as Moulder argued in her application of Immanuel Wallerstein’s ‘core-
periphery’ dichotomy of the ‘modern world system’ (Moulder, 1977). In the late and 
early 20th centuries Japanese ownership levels in China were so high that the nation, 
colonized by several foreign powers at the time, hosted 77.5 per cent of the total 
Japanese FDI, spread through key sectors such as coal mining, iron works, shipping, 
cotton industries and banking (Dunning and Lundan, 2008, p. 157). Central Asia 
became Russia’s periphery in the tsarist and the Soviet eras. It now occupies a 
peripheral place in relation to the Chinese economic expansion (Sutter, 2008, p. 263). 
The topic of Central Asia’s current political relations with Russia is important but beyond 
the scope of this discussion. China has developed a dependence on commodities 
7 
 
exports from Central Asia. Overall, China has many peripheries but they are not locked 
in a similarly crucial and close proximity relationship (Stares et al., 2011). One analysis 
argues that Central Asians are unsure whether Chinese trade and FDI will benefit the 
economic development of Central Asia and whether China is engaged in economic 
imperialism as virtually all of China’s imports from Central Asia are raw materials, and 
its exports to the region are cheap manufactured goods which prompt some Central 
Asians to conclude that China is dumping its goods in the region while looting their raw 
materials (Scobell et al., 2014, p. 42). Yet, in the future, some of the Chinese electronics 
and automotive manufacturing MNEs may move into the region, and transfer their 
technology and production systems for high value added goods manufacturing.  After 
the 2008 global financial crisis, Chinese economic expansion continued with domestic 
demand growth, but it moved from the orbit of the OECD nations’ economic cycles and 
increased its trade and FDI relationships with developing nations (Barcena et al., 2011, 
pp. 7, 29). China’s development of a niche in frugal engineering enables them to 
manufacture low cost versions of goods for mass markets (Athreye and Kapur, 2009, 
p. 214). This has provided them with ‘ownership advantages’ that other nations’ 
manufacturing MNEs lack. When the proximity of Central Asia as a ready-market for 
their manufactures, and their energy market relations with the region are taken into 
account, Chinese MNEs also possess a ‘locational advantage’ that other nations’ MNEs 
can never develop as they are not bordering Central Asia. Essentially, there is no other 
country in the world that can replicate the price levels of Chinese manufactured 
consumer goods in Central Asian markets. This means that presently Central Asian 
markets appear to be in an asymmetrical reciprocal relationship with the Chinese 
market. The lack of strength of the Central Asian economies in comparison is apparent 
in the emergence of the SCO, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), and 
the now-defunct post-Soviet formations (i.e. EurAsEc) all of which can be seen as 
attempts maintain the region’s status quo, which is limited by its geography, and its 
underdeveloped institutions of manufacturing, trade and investment. International trade 
has long been characterized by fragmentation of production which parts and 
components manufacturing are outsourced, predominantly from China (Kierzkowski 
and Chen, 2010, pp. 67-69). Central Asia, instead of remaining an export market 
ground for low cost Chinese consumer goods, can negotiate itself, possibly as a type 
of regional trade bloc, into the Chinese manufacturing chains and produce parts and 
components as a condition of bi-lateral trade. This would significantly reduce the 
present asymmetrical reciprocity. However, this discussion is a mere conjecture of the 
present moment. China may never shift production outside its borders. Prior Asian 
waves of electronics exports to the EU and the US markets occurred without shifting 
production to those markets (Dunning and Lundan, 2008, p. 534). China may follow 
precedent, and given its still large rural population that it wants to urbanize, it may be 
even less willing to shift any production out of the country. 
 
Central Asian Natural Gas and Crude Oil Exports  
Central Asia has been an energy producer since period of the occupation by the 
Russian Empire. Azerbaijan became a major crude oil exporter in the middle of the 19th 
century, followed by Kazakhstan, and after the Second World War Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan became major natural gas and crude oil producers (Feddersen and 
Zuccatto, 2013, p. 160). Diversification of Central Asian crude oil routes out of the 
region started in the mid-1990s, and in the late 2000s natural gas exports began to be 
exported to markets other than Russia, which undermined the latter’s aims to maintain 
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control over them (Coburn, 2010b, p. 21). Central Asia’s detachment from the Soviet 
Union made a big impact on the Chinese economy.  
 
Table 3: Crude Oil Reserves, Production, Consumption, and Production/Consumption Ratio  
(2013) 
 R (Thousand M. tonnes) P (M. tonnes) C (M. Tonnes) P/C Ratio (%) 
Azerbaijan 1.0 43.4 4.6 10.6 
Kazakhstan 3.9 83.8 13.8 16.5 
Uzbekistan 0.1 2.9 3.3 113.8 
Turkmenistan 0.1 11.4 6.3 55.3 
Russia 12.7 531.4 153.1 28.8 
Source: British Petroleum, 2014b, pp. 6,10, 11. 
 
Table 4: Natural Gas Reserves (excl. LPG), Production, Consumption, and 
Production/Consumption Ratio (2013) 
 R (Trillion cu. ft.) P (Billion cu. ft.) C (Billion cu. ft.) P/C Ratio (%) 
Azerbaijan 31.0 16.2 8.6 53.1 
Kazakhstan 53.9 18.5 11.4 61.6 
Uzbekistan 38.3 55.2 45.2 81.9 
Turkmenistan 617.3 62.3 22.3 35.8 
Russia 1103.6 604.8 413.5 68.4 
Source: British Petroleum, 2014a, pp. 20, 22, 23. 
 
Table 5: Kazakh and Turkmen Natural Gas (excl. LPG) Export Markets (%) (2013) 
 Russia China Iran Other Total 
Kazakhstan 97.5 0.8   1.7 100 
Turkmenistan 24.7 60.9 11.7 2.7 100 
Source: British Petroleum, 2014a, p. 28. 
 
In 2010, China’s first international natural gas pipeline connection, the Central Asian 
Gas Pipeline (CAGP) connected its demand with the Central Asian supply, and began 
to transport natural gas from Turkmenistan, through Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan to 
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (Energy Information Administration, 2014a, p. 
24). The intricacy of this path, determined by geography, is a representation of the 
Chinese reach to Central Asia. The CAGP is not to be confused with Central Asia-
Center Gas Pipeline of Gazprom, which runs from Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and 
Kazakhstan into Russia. As per China’s crude oil imports from Central Asia, the 
Kazakhstan-China pipeline has been transporting Russian and Kazakh oil since 2006, 
and in 2011, the Russian-China crude oil pipeline began operations (Energy 
Information Administration, 2014a, p. 13). Crude Oil and natural gas pipelines form a 
new type of new Silk Road that connects Central Asia as well as Russia to all the 
importers and contribute to this century’s energy politics  (Coburn, 2010a, p. 19). 
However, this path of a possible reconstruction of the Silk Road stopped at Central 
Asia-Iran border. Turkmenistan has also been exporting natural gas to Iran through two 
pipelines since 1997. This trade relationship, despite its potential, has not progressed 
well, due to the disagreement over price. Iran is reportedly unwilling to continue to 
purchase the Turkmen natural gas that can eventually push up the share of the Chinese 
market beyond the current 70 per cent, making Turkmenistan solely reliant on exports 
to China (Pannier, 2014; Rickleton 2014a). Iran’s history of relations with the West, 
which has made it hard for Central Asian energy exports to pass through Turkey, and 
then onto to the EU, has strengthened the Russian position at first. Then, this situation 
became increasingly less relevant with the rise of the China as the dominant consumer 
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and importer of the natural gas and crude oil from Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, 
through pipelines and infrastructures built and paid for by the Chinese. The possession 
of ‘asset-exploiting type of FDI’ is necessary to extract resources, augment markets, 
create new ones, and co-ordinate, and integrate existing cross-border operations 
(Dunning et al. 2008, p. 9). Chinese SOEs’ FDI, underwritten by the nation’s foreign 
currency reserves, has established Chinese-Central Asian energy relations. The centre 
of the issue of Central Asian energy exports has thus long shifted to China. This will be 
the part of the region’s status quo until such time when new export pipelines to Europe 
can be established. Central Asian energy exports will continue to grow. In terms of the 
volume of natural gas exports, reliability of demand, and a trade deal free of past 
political dimensions, the Turkmen economy first broke its isolation by opening to the 
outside world via the Chinese energy demand, which has kept growing. The Turkmen 
natural gas is transported to China through three pipelines (between 2009 and 2014 
Line A, B, and C started operating with D being presently built) via central Uzbekistan, 
southern Kazakhstan, and northwest Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. Until 2009, 
Turkmenistan used to sell most of its natural gas to Russia’s Gazprom, which has 
drastically reduced its purchase volumes, and China became the major buyer and 
investor in the pipelines, and fields (Ziegler and Menon, 2014, p. 24). China’s 2014 deal 
with Turkmenistan will be boosting annual gas deliveries to China to about 65 billion 
cubic meters by 2020. Turkmenistan, unlike the other Central Asian countries, is not a 
member, observer, or dialogue partner, of the SCO of which the largest forces are 
Russia and China. China does not have border with Turkmenistan, but is a neighbour 
of Kazakhstan, which offers a secure and reliable replication of the volumes of oil it 
currently imports from East Africa, and the Persian Gulf (Du, 2011, p. 7). China began 
to invest US$5 billion in Kazakhstan’s Kashagan oil field in 2013, as part of a US$30 
billion deal (Lelyveld, 2013). Information on its crude oil reserves is presented above 
(British Petroleum, 2014b, pp. 6, 10, 11). The only transnational Turkmen crude oil 
pipeline goes to Kazakhstan via Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan also exports crude oil 
via foreign oil companies that operate in the country, by transporting it across the 
Caspian Sea (Energy Information Administration, 2014b). Its crude oil production, 
refining and export industries have massive growth potential but this is unlikely to occur 
in the near future, due to a lack of sufficient FDI, poor infrastructure and the status of 
the Caspian Sea, which was raised above. In order to meet its needs, Turkmenistan 
plans to utilize new technologies to produce gasoline from natural gas (Oil and Gas 
Journal 2014). Uzbekistan, by contrast, has sufficient reserves to be a major exporter 
(Feddersen and Zuccatto, 2013, p. 175). The present natural gas production volume in 
Uzbekistan is more than the combined volume of Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan 
production, and is close to that of Turkmenistan, but it is primarily consumed 
domestically (British Petroleum, 2014a, pp. 20, 22, 23). Uzbekistan was a major 
producer, during the Soviet era, in the 1960s and 1970s, which depleted most of the 
existing fields. New investment is needed for extraction and infrastructure as its present 
production is mostly for domestic consumption (80 per cent) and the rest is exported, 
via Central Asia-Center Gas Pipeline, to Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan, but China is also projected to be an export market following the loans 
provided by the Export Import Bank of China (Energy Information Administration, 2012, 
pp. 5-7). Among the few energy MNEs that invested in Uzbekistan, the US MNE, Tethys 
Petroleum, Korea National Oil Corporation, and the Malaysian SOE Petronas have 
withdrawn in 2013-2014 (Kim, 2014). In the long term, due to the close proximity to the 
region and its energy consumption levels, China may well be the largest source of new 
investment in the Uzbek oil and gas exploration and extraction industries, and 
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consequently it is possible that Chinese FDI may internalize these markets, and 
construct and manage their export routes across China to the Pacific seaboard to 
supply new buyers in Asia. 
 
Central Asian Economies 
The energy exports from Central Asia have been feeding the Chinese economic growth 
for the past decade.  This trade expansion accompanied Chinese FDI in energy export 
related infrastructure. Central Asia, in return, increased its imports of Chinese 
manufactures. Overall, Central Asia has become a destination predominantly for the 
Chinese FDI.  
 
Table 6: GDP and population in Central Asia, Eurasia and Asia Pacific 
 GDP (US$ millions) Population (millions) 
Kazakhstan 231,876 16.4 million 
Uzbekistan 56,805 29 million 
Turkmenistan  40,826 5.2 million 
Tajikistan 8,497 8.2 million 
Kyrgyzstan 7,225 5.5 million 
Azerbaijan 73,537 9.4 million 
Turkey 819,990 75 million 
Iran 367,098 77.4 million 
Mongolia 11,516 2.8 million 
Russia 2,096,774 142.8 million 
China 9,469,124 1.4 billion 
India 1,876,811 1.3 billion 
Japan 4,898,530 127.1 million 
Korea 1,304,468 49.3 million 
Source: UN, World Population 2012, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, 
2014. 
 
Table 7: Distribution of global FDI inward stock in Asia, the EU and North America (1995-2013) 
  1995 2013 % Change 
The EU 34.81 33.70 -3.19 
N. America 32.81 21.91 -33.20 
Japan 0.97 0.67 -31.11 
China 2.94 3.76 27.89 
Korea 0.53 0.66 24.12 
Mongolia 0.00 0.06 5451.34 
Iran 0.07 0.16 141.90 
Turkey 0.43 0.57 31.64 
Azerbaijan 0.01 0.05 462.90 
Kazakhstan 0.08 0.51 504.68 
Kyrgyzstan 0.00 0.01 225.28 
Russia 0.16 2.26 1288.85 
Tajikistan 0.00 0.01 448.86 
Turkmenistan 0.01 0.09 649.54 
Uzbekistan 0.00 0.03 985.11 
Source: UNCTAD FDI/TNC database, 2014. 
 
From a global perspective, Central Asia’s share of net global FDI inflows are low and 
concentrated in mining, natural gas and crude oil extraction industries that involve 
relatively low skill jobs (OECD 2013: 15-17).  In 2013, FDI inward stock in Central Asia 
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was 0.65 of the global total. This appears to be rather a poor distribution of global FDI 
inward stock given the predictions made about the region’s future as an energy exporter 
but there were large percentage increases from 1995 to 2013 (Table 7) during which 
the totality of the global FDI inward stock increased by 640 per cent. In the area 
surrounding Central Asia, global FDI inward stock shares of China, Russia, Turkey and 
Kazakhstan were the highest in 2013 (Table 7). Kazakhstan holds the largest stock of 
FDI in Central Asia, and is by far the largest economy (over four times the size of 
Uzbekistan economy). Central Asian countries, Russia and Azerbaijan, among others, 
all belong to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development classification 
of ‘transitional economies’. As an investor, Kazakhstan is the largest foreign direct 
investing Central Asian country, followed by Azerbaijan (UNCTAD, 2014b, pp. 7, 72, 
89). All Central Asian countries are in the group of ‘land locked countries’, which 
combined with their development status, and past political geography have made their 
prospects somewhat limited without construction of new infrastructure and sound 
market policies (Feigenbaum, 2011, p. 62). Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are 
frequently urged to reduce the subsidies for household energy consumption, with a 
view to increase the share of private capital (IMF, 2014b, p. 56). This, however, may 
prove to be a recipe for civil discontent. Energy consumption subsidies are income 
supplements. They are a form of non-market income or welfare measure for the 
population that relies on them for above subsistence level living. Overall, Central Asia, 
as a region, compares poorly to other developing regions. It has some of the lowest 
‘employment-to-population’ ratios in the world, and its unemployment rates, particularly 
among the youth, exceed the rates for other developing regions (IMF, 2014b, p. 86). 
The region also has developed reliance on consumption driven by a large consumer-
lending sector (IMF, 2014b, p. 57).  
 
 
Table 8: Share of manufacturing value added in GDP (%) in Central Asia and Asia Pacific 
 2006 2011 
Kazakhstan 11.74 11.03 
Uzbekistan no data   
Turkmenistan no data   
Tajikistan 26.88 20.47 
Kyrgyzstan 10.7 11.41 
Azerbaijan 5.26 3.41 
Turkey 17.51 18.07 
Iran 10.9 10.37 
Mongolia 5.96 5.97 
Russia 15.45 13.71 
China 32.62 34.15 
India 14.78 14.89 
Japan 21.8 20.53 
Korea 25.37 27.74 
Source: UNIDO, 2014, p. 196-203. 
 
As displayed in Table 9, ‘share of manufacturing value added’ in GDP in percentage 
terms is not a major factor in Central Asian economies, nor is the ‘share of world 
manufacturing value added’. The same situation applies to Azerbaijan, Mongolia and 
Russia as well, presenting a weakness in their economic connections to the rest of the 
world.  None of them are significant participants in the value added manufacturing 
activities of the industrialised world. In their immediate neighborhood, only Turkey 
recorded a modest improvement from 2006 to 2011. Economically and politically, 
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Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan to a lesser extent, are the most stable Central Asian 
countries, while Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan have all experienced lower 
economic performance, law and order problems, including civil violence, and suffered 
from rising crime rates (Feigenbaum, 2011, pp. 60-63). 
 
Table 9: Share of world manufacturing value added in GDP (%) in Central Asia and Asia Pacific 
 2006 2011 
Kazakhstan 0.09 0.11 
Uzbekistan  no data   
Turkmenistan  no data   
Tajikistan 0.01 0.01 
Kyrgyzstan 0 0 
Azerbaijan 0.01 0.01 
Turkey 1.14 1.27 
Iran 0.28 0.28 
Mongolia 0 0 
Russia 1.61 1.49 
China 10.44 16.42 
India 1.7 2.25 
Japan 12.74 10.7 
Korea 2.84 3.36 
Source: UNIDO, 2014, pp. 196-203. 
 
The types of insurgencies that troubled Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan in the 
post-Soviet years have not been witnessed in Turkmenistan (Cornell and Jonsson, 
2014, pp. 19-20). Kazakhstan, however, has experienced some troubles in 2011-2014 
(Nichol, 2014, pp. 22-24). As per Table 10, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan are the largest 
recipients, in Central Asia, of the OECD aid for development. However, the overall aid 
share of Central Asia in comparison to other developing regions is not high. 
 
Table 10: Central Asia Share of the OECD Development Aid 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Azerbaijan 0.078 0.000 0.000 0.223 0.269 0.431 0.509 
Kazakhstan 0.395 0.941 0.625 0.593 1.352 0.813 0.407 
Kyrgyzstan 0.285 0.219 0.242 0.183 0.234 0.331 0.274 
Tajikistan 0.236 0.183 0.205 0.245 0.259 0.205 0.245 
Turkmenistan 0.000 0.015 0.008 0.021 0.024 0.074 0.079 
Uzbekistan 0.137 0.177 0.140 0.152 0.133 0.103 0.290 
Source: OECD, 2014. 
 
Russia and China have undeniable influence on the future of Central Asian resource 
and energy exports and the pertaining logistical problems (Feddersen and Zuccatto, 
2013, pp. 165, 167, 169; Starr et al., 2014, p. 40). Central Asian energy exports are 
affected by demand, and price and the lack of diversified export markets simultaneously 
(IMF, 2014a, p.60). Logistical problems also trouble Central Asia’s massive and 
primarily untapped mineral reserves. Kazakhstan has the most developed mining and 
processing industries that contribute to its economic growth, Uzbekistan and 
Kyrgyzstan possess two of the largest gold, and other important ore reserves in the 
world, and Tajikistan, despite its difficult terrain, has growth potential as is the case with 
Turkmenistan’s underdeveloped mineral mining sector (Asian Development Bank, 
2010, pp. 63-66). Tajikistan also possesses large aluminum reserves and is one of the 
biggest aluminum processors in the world (Nichol, 2014, p. 42). However, as in the 
case of Australia, resource rich countries can have problems developing value added 
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manufacturing, especially if they are far from major markets (Bayari, 2012). Mining and 
natural gas and oil extraction define FDI in Central Asia. Kazakhstan is the second 
largest recipient of FDI, followed by Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, and Uzbekistan, 
Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan respectively (UNCTAD, 2014c, pp. 70-72). The EU is the 
largest investor, while North America is a minor one, in the region due to dual European 
needs of energy imports and access to export markets. The EU has also been the 
destination of FDI from the Russian Federation and Kazakhstan in 2005-2013 that has 
been dominated by investments in petroleum and natural gas companies but has also 
included purchases of rail transport companies, department stores, banks, and steel 
manufacturers (UNCTAD, 2014c, pp. 72, 75). This trend appears to represent a 
conciliation of Russian and Kazakh foreign interests overseas to smooth out their 
export market expansion. Overall, FDI has contributed to economic growth in 
Kazakhstan (especially in 2006-2008), Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Mongolia, and 
the last two have been the largest recipients in the past five years (UNCTAD, 2014c, 
pp. 90, 91). 
 
Conclusion 
Chinese economy has built a solid relationship with Central Asian economies and the 
intensity of this connection will increase with further rises in Chinese energy imports 
and Central Asian consumption of Chinese manufactured products. China-Central Asia 
economic relations, via the presence of Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region in the 
equation, are likely to expand further in the next several decades. One issue that has 
not been covered here is Central Asia’s reliance on agricultural exports and its rapidly 
intensifying water shortages. Chinese foreign currency reserves play a major role in 
purchase and stockpiling, and thus price control, of agricultural exports, which 
accentuate the nature of economic relationship in between. Water is becoming an 
expensive commodity in Central Asia. The region is in fact exporting its precious water 
supplies when it exports cotton to China. The region’s oil and gas industries are also 
major users of water. Overall, every export-related economic activity exacerbates the 
region’s water trouble. Another major issue that needs to be discussed elsewhere is 
the security arrangements that involve Central Asia, such as the CSTO, and the SCO 
as well as the oft-quoted Silk Road Economic Belt project. These topics are crucial for 
the future of Central Asia. The discussion herein has defined the roles that Russia and 
China have had in Central Asia in the last so many decades and the impact of the 
Chinese economic growth on the region. Central Asia has immense natural resources, 
and needs to connect to new markets and augment its current market relations while 
dealing with the shortcomings in its industrial structures that readily make it an easy 
market for foreign consumer goods. Central Asia is not a major development aid 
receiver, and while its inward FDI stocks have increased since the fall of the Soviet 
Union, its energy sector is the primary recipient. Economic diversification, especially in 
manufacturing, appears to be the obvious answer that will require the development of 
domestically constituted market policies.  
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